Capabilities, Human Nature, and Liberalism

Sacco, G.
Metaphilosophy
2026

Despite being considered one of the most promising theories of justice, Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (CA) has faced significant objections from liberal scholars. This article reconstructs and addresses three major critiques: that an exclusive focus on capabilities rather than functioning is ineffective in protecting people’s well-being; that the CA is paternalistic; and that it relies on a vague notion of human nature. I argue that, although Nussbaum’s account has the resources to respond to these objections, incorporating John Stuart Mill’s harm principle offers a more robust defense of the CA. This liberal principle provides a criterion for distinguishing the human capabilities that merit political protection from those that do not, while also helping the CA address objections from paternalism and laissez-faire. I then consider how Mill’s principle should shape the CA’s treatment of self-harm—that is, actions that negatively affect only the person who performs them.

[Sacco, 2026] Sacco, G. (2026). Capabilities, Human Nature, and Liberalism. Metaphilosophy, in press, DOI:10.1111/meta.70041